Era Nietzsche um relativista conservador ou, pelo contrário, seria possível alocar o filósofo no sítio teórico do pensamento crítico? Tal pergunta-problema delimita o presente artigo. Ela se refere a uma conhecida querela entre modelos interpretativos (SEBOLD, [20--?]) pós-modernos e naturalistas e, especificamente, deriva da revisão de literatura de uma pesquisa em andamento, realizada no âmbito do curso de doutorado do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação da Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, a partir da qual observamos uma ausência, talvez um esquecimento (...) em relação à contribuição de Nietzsche para a filosofia crítica no campo da Educação, espaço acadêmico no qual as pesquisas, em grande medida, alinham-se à recepção relativista de seu pensamento. A hipótese central, comprovada pela análise de posições filosóficas de Nietzsche (1979; 1992a; 1992b; 1998; 2000; 2003; 2004) e de alguns de seus comentadores, considera que o filósofo é um pensador crítico (HEIT, 2018; HEIT; PICHLER, 2015), não relativista (MARTON, 2011), perspectivista (CORBANEZI, 2013; MATTOS, 2013) e adepto a um tipo perspectivístico de naturalismo (CARVALHO, 2018; HEIT, 2016; HEIT, 2015; ITAPARICA, 2018), traços que de certa forma tendem a impactar a cosmovisão, quase hegemônica, no que diz respeito à recepção nietzschiana no campo da educação. O objetivo central do artigo é destacar que a discussão destes aspectos pode levar a um reposicionamento da filosofia de Nietzsche no universo do pensamento contemporâneo, incluindo-se aí a pesquisa em educação, bem como compreender em que medida a perspectiva crítica se choca com a perspectiva relativista no que diz respeito à teorização de uma formação de caráter emancipatório. Em termos metodológicos, a análise da revisão de literatura recorre à hermenêutica crítica. (shrink)

Resumo: Era Nietzsche um inimigo da ciência? A pergunta-problema deste artigo é justamente o título de uma conferência proferida pelo Dr. Helmut Heit (Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche - Klassik Stiftung Weimar) no Seminário de Filosofia da Ciência do Instituto Federal do Espírito Santo, campus Linhares, em 9 de dezembro de 2014. Uma famosa versão do senso comum acadêmico apresenta Nietzsche como inimigo mortal das ciências. Sabe-se, contudo, que o filósofo manteve uma relação intensa, duradoura e necessária com o campo científico. A (...) partir de fontes primárias e de posicionamentos adotados por pesquisadores especializados, no presente estudo conclui-se que Nietzsche foi concomitantemente um entusiasta do método científico – em função da possibilidade de naturalização e de historicização da produção de conhecimento – e um crítico da fundamentação dogmática das ciências de seu tempo. A caracterização de Nietzsche como pensador crítico-perspectivista (não relativista) está desenvolvida em um artigo inédito de nossa autoria. Palavras-chave: Nietzsche; Ciência; Nietzsche e as ciências. On Nietzsche's necessary critical-perspectivist adherence to the sciences Abstract: Was Nietzsche an enemy of science? The problem question of this article is precisely the title of a lecture given by Dr. Helmut Heit (Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche - Klassik Stiftung Weimar), presented at the Philosophy of Science Seminar of the Federal Institute of Espírito Santo, Linhares campus, on December 9, 2014. A famous version of academic common sense presents Nietzsche as the mortal enemy of science. It is known, however, that the philosopher maintained an intense, lasting and necessary relationship with the scientific field. From the use of primary sources and the positions adopted by specialized researchers, in the present study, it is concluded that Nietzsche was concomitantly an enthusiast of the scientific method - due to the possibility of naturalization and historicization of the production of knowledge – and a critic of the scientific method. dogmatic foundation of the sciences of his time. The characterization of Nietzsche as a critical-perspectivist (non-relativist) thinker is developed in an unpublished article of our authorship. Key-words: Nietzsche; Science; Nietzsche and the Sciences. Sobre la necesaria adhesión crítico-perspectivista de Nietzsche a las ciencias Resumen: ¿Nietzsche era enemigo de la ciencia? La pregunta problema de este artículo es precisamente el título de una conferencia del Prof. Dr. Helmut Heit (Universidad de Berlín), presentado en el Seminario de Filosofía de la Ciencia del Instituto Federal de Espírito Santo, campus Linhares, el 9 de diciembre de 2014. Si bien Nietzsche llegó a ser catalogado como positivista (MIGNONI, 2017), una famosa versión académica lo presenta como el enemigo mortal de las ciencias. Se sabe, sin embargo, que el filósofo mantuvo una relación intensa, duradera y necesaria con el campo científico. A partir del uso de fuentes primarias y de las posiciones adoptadas por investigadores especializados, en el presente estudio se concluye que Nietzsche fue concomitantemente un entusiasta del método científico – por la posibilidad de naturalización e historización de la producción del conocimiento – y un crítico del fundamento dogmatico de las ciencias de su tiempo. La caracterización de Nietzsche como pensador crítico-perspectivista (no relativista) se desarrolla en un artículo inédito de nuestra autoria. Palabras clave: Nietzsche. Ciencia. Nietzsche y las Ciencias. Nietzsche en la Investigación en Educación. (shrink)

La pandemia COVID-19 ha planteado retos, donde las TIC se ha convertido en una necesidad básica para la humanidad, en este contexto se cuestionó las capacidades de los docentes para hacer frente a los cambios. Tiene una metodología mixta pre- experimental, participaron 49 docentes y se aplicó cuestionario, rubrica y Pre Test/Post Test, con valores 0.890; 0.91, 0.97 de Cronbach. Los hallazgos demostraron que las dimensiones, comunicación, creación de contenidos, resultaron muy altas, mientras que la dimensión seguridad y solución de (...) problemas resultaron ser buenas. La investigación obtuvo resultados significativos para el desarrollo de las competencias digitales de los docentes de Piura. (shrink)

Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form (...) of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...) in combating epistemic injustice. My response to Goldberg principally concerns my perceptual account of the epistemology of testimony, which I defend as being both well-motivated and best categorized as a species of non-inferentialism. I also explain its relation to the reductionism/non-reductionism contrast, and defend my resistance to casting it as any kind of default view. In response to Hookway, I contrast discriminatory with distributive forms of epistemic injustice, and defend the basic taxonomy I present in the book, which casts testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as the two fundamental discriminatory forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This (...) paper explains how, by showing that the basic role each plays in moral-social life is the same; and that one is conceptually and therefore historically prior to the other. The result is pluralism, with each kind of forgiveness represented as distinctive in both its psychology and its normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration. (shrink)

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...) lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. (shrink)

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...) significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom. (shrink)

Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which (...) his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought—its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum—still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons, the relativism of distance, and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously underdetermine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams’s ethical philosophy taken as a whole. I label the object of this root conviction ethical freedom, and thus portray Williams as a philosopher of ethical freedom. (shrink)

We gain information from collective, often institutional bodies all the time—from the publications of committees, news teams, or research groups, from web sites such as Wikipedia, and so on—but do these bodies ever function as genuine group testifiers as opposed to mere group sources of information? In putting the question this way I invoke a distinction made, if briefly, by Edward Craig, which I believe to be of deep significance in thinking about the distinctiveness of the speech act of testimony. (...) The distinction is that between somebody’s functioning as a ‘good informant’ and their functioning merely as a ‘source of information’. The difference between these has, as he remarks, a crucial ethical aspect: What I have in mind is the special flavour of situations in which human beings treat each other as subjects with a common purpose, rather than as objects from which services, in this case true belief, can be extracted. In this paper I shall try to bring out the distinctive nature of the role of good informant in a way that helps to clarify what is at stake in asking whether there can be group testimony in the sense of genuinely collective testimony—that is to say, where the group testifier is a collective and not merely a sum of individuals testifying in one or another form of aggregated chorus. (shrink)

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. (...) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to attack some of the conceptual problems that arise when the framework of mathematical learning theory is applied to the description of the behavior of the firm, in setting prices and production quotas, in a competitive market. The goal is to depict the process by which the firm fixes prices and production quotas as a stochastic learning process. A solution to such problems is proposed which is based on statistical-decision concepts. The conceptualization of (...) the behavior of the firm by means of concepts pertaining to mathematical learning theory gives rise to certain mathematical problems, which are formulated here in rather precise terms. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...) likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed. (shrink)

[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the (...) powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic oppression. The word ‘structured’ may be read materially, so as to imply that social institutions and practices favour the powerful, or ontologically, so as to imply that the powerful somehow constitute the world. But for present purposes I am interested only in an epistemological reading, which implies that the powerful have some sort of unfair advantage in “structuring” our understandings of the social world. I will try to present an account of what this initially vague idea involves. I hope thereby to explain an exact sense in which the powerful can have a kind of epistemic advantage that means the powerless are epistemically oppressed. (shrink)

The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify (...) to the intellectual value of feminism as a radicalizing energy internal to philosophical inquiry. This volume will be essential reading for any student or teacher of philosophy who is curious about the place of feminism in their subject. (shrink)

I consider Katherine Hawley's commitment account of interpersonal trustworthiness alongside her sceptical challenge regarding the value of philosophically modelling institutional trustworthiness as distinct from reliability. I argue, pace Hawley's challenge, that there would be significant diagnostic and explanatory loss if we were to content ourselves with ideas of institutional (un)reliability alone; and I offer an illustrative case where institutional unreliability is only the half of it, indicating that when it comes to certain kinds of institutional dysfunction, we do need philosophical (...) models of institutional ‘distrustworthiness’ if we are to achieve a proper diagnosis. (shrink)

She was to a degree the tool of her husband. However, despite the fact she was under his influence to a degree she cannot escape if the Bank took all reasonable steps to ensure that she had appreciated and understood what she was signing. It may be that Mrs Wright-Bailey did not have an adequate comprehension of the nature of the charge... [E]ven if she did not, the Bank did take all reasonable steps.

Este texto apresenta alguns elementos para se pensar a educação na vida e na obra de Espinosa.

Resumen: Este artículo destaca el lugar fundamental que Hegel da al concepto de Pietät en la conformación ética de la comunidad occidental y su influencia en el pensamiento social. Con base en la tesis hegeliana del origen artístico-religioso de la filosofía, el artículo ubica la Pietät en la lectura que Hegel hizo de la Antígona de Sófocles, y se guía por tres conceptos estructurantes: ley, revelación y conciliación, destacando el lugar radical de la mujer en la humanización de la comunidad, (...) por lo que se conforma en dos partes generales: la exposición preponderantemente masculina y el arribo al planteamiento femenino como intento de superación de la filosofía. Por ello, este trabajo se apoya en la interpretación que hacen algunos pensadores sociales de la lectura hegeliana de la Antígona y concluye que el concepto de Pietät constituye un marco fundamental para el pensamiento de Hegel para revelar el componente sustancial humano-comunitario de la civilización moderna.: This article highlights the fundamental place that Hegel gives to the concept of Pietät in the ethical conformation of the Western community and its influence on social thought. Based on the Hegelian thesis of the artistic-religious origin of philosophy, this work locates concept of Pietät in the reading that Hegel made of Sophocles’ Antigone. Which is why this article is guided by three structuring concepts: law, revelation, and conciliation, standing out the radical site of women in the humanization of civilization, so it is built on two general parts: the preponderantly male exposure and the arriving to a female approach as a try of overcome philosophy. It is why this writing leans on the interpretation some social researchers have made of Hegelian’s reading of Antigone and concludes that the concept of Pietät makes a fundamental framework to Hegel’s thought to reveal the substantial human-communitary component of modern civilization. (shrink)

Aquest article reflexiona el model educatiu català i les implicacions del model de relacions amb la diversitat cultural a l’entorn educatiu, sobretot als àmbits de la socialització i l’ús de la llengua catalana, com a marcadors identitaris simbòlics rellevants. A més d’això, es reflexiona sobre els grups minoritaris a l’entorn educatiu català, en especial els alumnes d’origen no comunitari i d’origen gitano i les seves relacions amb la comunitat d’acollida.This article reflects on the Catalan educational model and the implications of (...) this model on the relations with the cultural diversity on the educational environment, especially on the socialisation and the use of the Catalan language, as relevant symbolic identity markers. On top of that, it reflects on the minority groups on the Catalan educational system, specially about the students of immigrant backgrounds and from Gipsy origin, and their social relations with the hostess community. (shrink)

Today, people are better informed about environmental degradation than ever before. However, this does not imply that people are more engaged toward ecological issues nor are they more committed to achieve greater ecological justice. In this respect, environmental education is paradigmatic: the current generation of young people is, by far and without any doubt, the most knowledgeable and aware of environmental problems thanks, among other things, to the presence since the end of the 20th century of environmental education in primary (...) and secondary school. However, levels of commitment to ecological issues that are significantly higher than before are not observed, except when it comes to individual pro-environmental behavior. How to link environmental awareness with a collective, political, ecosocial and ecocitizen commitment? In order to advance avenues for reflection on this issue, firstly this article presents the elements that characterize the current ecosocial crisis. Secondly, it addresses the ecosocial crisis as a crisis of knowledge that ultimately points to the challenge of transforming the visions of the world. Thirdly, it considers the ecosocial crisis as an opportunity that opens up the possibility of creating new worlds on the planet. Fourthly, the ecosocial crisis is presented as a crisis of contemporary education. Fifthly, it summarizes the two risks to consider in the practice of ecosocial education: the risk of dogmatism and the risk of blaming individuals for global problems. Finally, some clues are proposed that point to the Philosophy for children program as a program that can support the educational practice needed by the current educational and ecosocial crisis, as well as limits recognized risks of ecosocial education. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to provide a logical reconstruction of the Marxian Theory of Value. This reconstruction is based upon the concept of abstract as opposed to that of homogeneous labor. Abstract labour is a social relation that holds in a market economy, (at least) whenever the profit rate is uniform; it consists in a comparison of the different labors through the exchange relationship. The author proved in a different place (see García de la Sienra, 1987) that (...) there exists a mathematical representation of abstract labor which is unique up to similarity transformations. The existence of this function — which is none other than the value function — is the basis of the present axiomatization, which includes detailed reconstructions of two of the most important models of the theory. (shrink)

The notion of recognition is an ethically potent resource for understanding human relational needs; and its negative counterpart, misrecognition, an equally potent resource for critique. Axel Honneth’s rich account focuses our attention on recognition’s role in securing basic self-confidence, moral self-respect, and self-esteem. With these loci of recognition in place, we are enabled to raise the intriguing question whether each of these may be extended to apply specifically to the epistemic dimension of our agency and selfhood. Might we talk intelligibly—while (...) staying in tune with Honneth’s concepts and their Hegelian key—of a generic idea of epistemic recognition? Such an idea might itself be seen to apply at the same three levels to indicate: first, basic epistemic self-confidence; second, our status as epistemically responsible; and third, a certain epistemic self-esteem that reflects the epistemic esteem we receive from others. The papers in this volume surely sound a chord in the affirmative, and together they steer us towards a multifaceted conception of how epistemic injustice is related to epistemic misrecognition, and indeed how we might construe a positive relation of epistemic recognition. (shrink)

Our understanding of social experiences is central to our social understanding more generally. But this sphere of epistemic practice can be structurally prejudiced by unequal relations of power, so that some groups suffer a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice—hermeneutical injustice. I aim to achieve a clear conception of this epistemicethical phenomenon, so that we have a workable definition and a proper understanding of the wrong that it inflicts.

My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the concept of knowledge so that they may (...) be seen to resonate positively with Williams's epistemological picture: the admixture of internalist and externalist features; the proto-contextualism; and, finally, the distinctively genealogical antisceptical impetus. In this way I aim to support and augment the socialized anti-sceptical case mounted by Williams, and so to show that expanding epistemology in the temporal dimension can be a productive move in central debates in epistemology. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (1) 2008: pp. 27-50. (shrink)

Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How should we make sense of this apparent conflict? This paper argues that we should learn something from each, seeing these views as representing opposing moments in a perennial and well-grounded moral ambivalence towards forgiveness. Once we are correctly positioned, we shall see an aspect of forgiveness that recommends precisely this ambivalence. For what will come into view will be certain key psychological mechanisms of moral-epistemic influence – other-addressed and (...) self-addressed mechanisms of moral social construction – that enable forgiveness to function well when it is well-functioning, but which are also intrinsically prone to deterioration into one or another form of bad faith. Thus forgiveness is revealed as necessarily containing seeds of its own corruption, showing ambivalence to be a generically appropriate attitude. Moreover, it is emphasized that where forgiver and forgiven are relating to one another in the context of asymmetries of social power, the practice of forgiveness is likely to be further compromised, notably increasing the risk of negative influence on the moral-epistemic states of either the forgiver or the forgiven, or both. (shrink)

Taking on topics from pornography and prostitution to female genital mutilation, from womens magazines and marriage to sexual violence, contributors in this collection argue that the kind of liberal feminism currently rising to prominence does little to challenge the status quo.